Young Buyers in Portugal Can Now Buy Homes with Zero Down Payment—But at a Cost

Economy,  National News
Young couple discussing mortgage options at desk with apartment building visible in background
Published 3h ago

The Portugal housing market has witnessed a dramatic shift: one in every four new home loans now carries financing above 90% of the property value, a leap driven almost entirely by the government's guarantee scheme for buyers under 36. This marks a fundamental change in the risk profile of mortgage lending across the country, with nearly €900M of the €1.55B state guarantee already deployed by late March.

Why This Matters

100% financing is now common: 85% of loans backed by the state guarantee carried a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 100%, meaning zero down payment for eligible buyers.

Risk concentration is rising: 21% of all new borrowers in 2025 fell into the high-risk category, up from just 3% the previous year.

Longer debt horizons: More than a third of new mortgages now stretch beyond 35 years, with 70% of borrowers expected to still owe money past age 70.

The scheme runs until end of 2026: Eligible buyers have until December 31, 2026, to lock in state-backed financing for properties up to €450,000.

How the Guarantee Works in Practice

The Portugal Ministry of Finance enacted Decree-Law 44/2024 in July of that year, establishing a public guarantee that allows the state to act as co-signer for up to 15% of a property's purchase price. For a young buyer acquiring a €200,000 apartment, this means the government underwrites €30,000 of the loan, enabling banks to lend the full amount without requiring the traditional 10% cash deposit.

Eligibility is tightly defined. Applicants must be aged 35 or younger, hold tax residency in Portugal, earn below the 8th income tax bracket (around €81,000 annually as of 2025), own no other residential property, and have no outstanding debts to tax authorities or social security. The home must serve as a permanent primary residence and cannot exceed €450,000 in value. Couples applying jointly must both meet the age threshold.

The guarantee remains active for up to 10 years from the contract signing date, after which the borrower assumes full liability. Banks still enforce their own creditworthiness tests, typically capping the debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio—the share of monthly income consumed by loan repayments—below 50%.

Market Impact and Risk Accumulation

Data from the Bank of Portugal's 2025 macroprudential monitoring report, released earlier this year, reveals the scale of the shift. In 2024, loans with LTV ratios above 90% represented a negligible 0.1% of new mortgages. By the end of 2025, that figure had surged to 19% of all new housing credit and 24% of loans for primary residences. The weighted average LTV climbed from 70% to 75% in a single year, hitting 99% for state-guaranteed contracts.

State-backed loans accounted for 23.5% of all mortgage contracts signed in 2025 and 26.8% of total credit volume disbursed for primary residence purchases. Young buyers aged 35 and under represented 58% of new mortgage contracts for permanent homes, an 11-percentage-point jump from 2024, with more than 40% of those contracts carrying the government guarantee.

The average loan size under the guarantee reached €207,000, compared to €174,000 for unsubsidized mortgages. This reflects both higher leverage and the fact that younger buyers, often entering the market for the first time, are purchasing in areas with elevated property prices.

Shifting Risk Profiles and Longer Maturities

The central bank's risk classification system assigns borrowers to three categories based on LTV and DSTI ratios. High-risk profiles—those with DSTI above 60% and LTV above 90%—jumped from 3% of new borrowers in 2024 to 21% in 2025. Intermediate-risk borrowers held steady at around 30%, while low-risk profiles (DSTI at or below 50%, LTV at or below 80%) dropped from 58% to 49%.

Strip out the state-guaranteed loans, however, and the picture stabilizes: just 3% of borrowers without the guarantee fell into the high-risk category in 2025, nearly identical to 2024 figures. This suggests the vulnerability is concentrated within the cohort benefiting from government backing.

Loan maturities have also extended. The average new mortgage now runs 32 years, unchanged from 2024 in headline terms, but the distribution has shifted. Only 40% of new contracts in 2025 had terms of 30 years or less, down six percentage points, while 35% exceeded 35 years, up from 25% the prior year. For borrowers with the state guarantee, the weighted average maturity hit 37.9 years; for borrowers aged 35 or younger without the guarantee, it was 35.8 years. The Bank of Portugal notes that roughly 70% of mortgagors will be over 70 when their loans mature.

What This Means for Residents

For young buyers, the guarantee has eliminated the most immediate barrier to homeownership: the deposit. A first-time purchaser in Lisbon or Porto, where median apartment prices hover near €300,000, no longer needs to save €30,000 plus closing costs—a sum that could take years to accumulate. Instead, they can enter the market immediately, provided they meet income and creditworthiness tests.

The trade-off is elevated financial exposure. A DSTI ratio of 33.7%—the average for guarantee-backed loans—means a third of net monthly income goes toward mortgage payments before accounting for utilities, maintenance, or property taxes. In a rising interest rate environment or during periods of income disruption (job loss, illness, parental leave), this leaves little cushion.

For the broader market, the influx of 100%-financed buyers sustains demand and supports prices, even as construction activity struggles to keep pace. The government has introduced separate measures in March 2026 aimed at boosting housing supply and encouraging affordable rentals, but these initiatives are expected to take years to materially affect inventory.

For taxpayers, the risk is contingent but real. If a significant number of guarantee-backed borrowers default—particularly if property values decline—the state absorbs the losses up to the 15% ceiling. The Bank of Portugal emphasizes that the guarantee mitigates bank exposure, but the systemic risk accumulates on the public balance sheet.

How Portugal Compares Across Europe

Portugal's approach sits within a broader European tradition of state intervention in housing finance, but the specifics vary widely. The Netherlands operates the Nationale Hypotheek Garantie (NHG), a government-backed fund that protects both lenders and borrowers in the event of forced sale, typically in exchange for a 0.7% premium added to the loan. Luxembourg offers a guarantee capping at €303,862 and covering up to 40% of project costs, but requires three years of documented savings. Poland's "Safe Credit 2%" program fixes interest at 2% for the first decade for buyers under 45. Greece blends zero-interest tranches (50% of the loan) with subsidized commercial credit for buyers aged 25 to 50, financing up to 90% of purchase value.

Portugal's model is notable for its age threshold (35 vs. 45 or 50 elsewhere), its focus on eliminating the deposit (rather than subsidizing interest rates), and its time limit (contracts must be signed by end-2026). The scheme is less generous than Poland's fixed-rate subsidy but more accessible than Luxembourg's savings requirement.

Budget and Utilization

The government initially allocated €1.2B to the guarantee, distributed across participating banks via quotas. Banks that exhausted their allocations could request top-ups, and by year-end 2025, the ceiling had risen to €1.55B. As of late March 2026, nearly 60% of the total envelope—approximately €900M—had been committed, suggesting the fund may be fully subscribed well before the December 2026 deadline unless further expanded.

Implications for Financial Stability

The Bank of Portugal has not raised systemic alarms but has flagged vulnerabilities. The combination of 100% LTV, elevated DSTI ratios, and multi-decade maturities means that a cohort of young households is entering a prolonged period of debt service with minimal equity buffers. In the event of a housing market correction, negative equity—where the outstanding loan exceeds the property's market value—becomes a plausible scenario.

For now, strong employment, wage growth, and declining interest rates (from their 2023 peaks) provide a supportive backdrop. The central bank's macroprudential framework, which caps LTV at 90% for standard loans and 80% for non-primary residences, remains in place for all lending outside the guarantee program, preserving a baseline of prudence.

Transfer Activity and Market Dynamics

One secondary effect of the guarantee has been a decline in loan transfers—refinancing or switching lenders to secure better terms. These operations typically carry lower LTV ratios because borrowers have already paid down principal. In 2024, transfers represented 19% of new mortgage activity; in 2025, that share fell to 9%. This reflects both the attractiveness of new originations under the guarantee and the practical reality that younger borrowers, lacking existing mortgages, cannot transfer.

The median DSTI for all new mortgages held steady at 29.6% in 2025, despite lower interest rates and rising incomes, because the influx of higher-leverage, higher-DSTI guarantee-backed loans offset improvements elsewhere.

Policy Outlook and Timing

The guarantee program remains open through the end of 2026, but the pace of utilization suggests it may be fully subscribed by late summer or early autumn. Prospective buyers should move quickly to lock in eligibility, particularly as property prices continue to rise—forecasts for 2026 point to continued growth, albeit at a more moderate pace than the double-digit gains seen in prior years.

For policymakers, the scheme has achieved its immediate goal: enabling market access for younger, lower-income buyers. Whether it proves sustainable depends on labor market resilience, housing supply expansion, and the trajectory of interest rates over the next decade. The Bank of Portugal will continue to monitor credit quality closely, and any sharp deterioration in borrower performance could prompt tighter macroprudential limits or a recalibration of the guarantee terms for future iterations.

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