Trainee Death in Lamego River Drill Halts Portuguese Special Forces Course

In a single night, the fast-rising waters of the Balsemão River have placed Portugal’s military training methods under an unforgiving spotlight, reviving memories of earlier tragedies and forcing the Army to confront uncomfortable questions about risk management, accountability and support for bereaved families.

In case you looked away for a moment

• Young officer candidate swept away during an elite training drill

• Weather alerts were in force, yet the exercise went ahead

• Army and Military Judiciary Police now probing possible safety lapses

• Political parties and veterans demand clearer protocols and transparency

• Incident echoes other fatal accidents in Portuguese special-forces courses

The nocturnal drill that turned lethal

The victim, 23-year-old Infantry Lieutenant João Rafael Paulino dos Santos Cardoso, was tackling a classic funicular crossing—essentially a rope bridge stretched over the Balsemão River near Lamego—when the torrent dragged him beneath the surface around 23:30 on 26 January. A night-long search involving drones, divers and thermal imaging ended at 08:50 the following morning when firefighters located the body downstream. The drill formed part of the demanding Special Operations Course run by the Centro de Tropas de Operações Especiais (CTOE), the Army’s answer to the Navy’s combat swimmers or the Air Force’s para-commandos.

Weather warnings and a rising current

Meteorologists had already hoisted a yellow alert for the Depressão Joseph system, forecasting heavy rain and gusts above 60 km/h throughout the Douro valley. Residents of Lamego had watched the Balsemão’s usually modest flow surge overnight, turning brown with debris. Despite the alert, the course supervisors opted not to postpone the river module—a decision now under intense scrutiny. Local rescue teams say the current that night was at least 3 times faster than average winter flow rates, complicating any mid-stream recovery.

How hard is the Special Operations Course?

The Army advertises the programme as a 15-week crucible that forges platoon leaders capable of air, land and riverine missions. Recruits endure punishing marches, live-fire manoeuvres, insurgent-style raids and hostage-rescue scenarios. Survival modules include water obstacles performed in daylight and darkness. Safety doctrine officially requires redundant ropes, flotation aids and a rescue swimmer station, yet instructors enjoy considerable discretion to adjust plans when weather worsens. One veteran of an earlier class told Público that “exercises can be delayed now—if someone higher up signs off,” hinting at a command-and-control grey zone.

Political voices turn up the heat

Within hours, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa issued a statement of condolence and promised to follow the investigation personally. Defence Minister Nuno Melo lamented the death and vowed that “everything will be examined.” The Left Bloc has tabled urgent questions in Parliament, pressing the ministry to disclose whether rescue divers, safety cables and real-time weather data were on hand. The party argues that repeated fatalities—from the 2016 Comandos course in Alcochete to this week’s incident—show a systemic failure to apply lessons learned.

A tragic pattern in elite training

Portugal’s armed forces have lost three trainees in high-intensity courses over the past decade. In September 2016, two soldiers succumbed to heatstroke and cardiac arrest during a sweltering march at the 127th Comandos Course. A board of inquiry recommended tighter medical screening and stress-test limits, yet many of those suggestions remain classified. The Lamego case now raises the spectre of whether previous reforms were ever fully implemented—or whether the culture of endurance at any cost still overshadows written protocols.

What investigators will focus on

Chain of command—who approved the river crossing despite an active weather alert?

Safety equipment—were life vests, throw-bags and illumination markers mandatory or optional?

Timing—why was the drill scheduled for late night rather than dawn when visibility improves?

Communication—did instructors have real-time hydrological data or rely on visual judgment alone?

Post-incident response—were psychological and financial support procedures for the family activated immediately?

Why civilian readers should care

Beyond the uniform, the fallen officer was a Mafra native, a neighbour, a university graduate who chose public service. His death ripples outward: taxpayers fund these courses, families loan their sons and daughters to the nation, and local economies—from barracks canteens to rescue brigades—are intertwined with military activity. Transparent answers on training risk versus operational necessity help ensure that future missions abroad—whether humanitarian in Mozambique or NATO patrols in the Baltic—draw on forces prepared to the highest standard without unnecessary sacrifice at home.

The road ahead

The Army has paused the current Special Operations Course until preliminary findings emerge. Final reports typically take months, but public pressure could accelerate timelines. Parliament’s National Defence Committee has already requested a full briefing, and the Government faces a delicate balance: honour the warrior ethos while demonstrating that 21st-century Portugal will not tolerate avoidable training deaths.

For now, a mourning flag flies at the Mafra Regiment, and the Balsemão runs a little quieter—its banks newly marked by bouquets and candles left by locals who never met João Cardoso but recognise the cost one family has paid for the country’s security.